A 'pervasive' problem in the social sciences, referred to as the 'micro-to-macro problem' concerns our capacity to explain the relationship between the constitutive elements of social systems (people) and emergent phenomena resulting from their interaction (i.e. organisations, societies, economies). Without a capacity to explain this relationship there is, in effect, no substantive theory of sociality. In this paper we explore the potential of a synthesis between autopoietic and complexity theory for understanding social systems in a way that addresses this issue. It will be argued that autopoietic theory provides a basis for understanding the characteristics of the microlevel agents that make up social systems − human individuals, whilst complexity theory provides a basis for understanding how these characteristics influence the range and type of macro level phenomena that arise from their interaction. The synthesis proposed here provides the basis for a theory of sociality that deals consistently with the relationship between the micro and macro levels of social phenomena and their ontological status. This approach has the potential to re-unite current scientific oppositions and avoid unnecessary pluralism within social science.
Introduction
In this paper we draw attention to a commonly overlooked yet 'pervasive' problem in the social sciences. It is most regularly referred to as the 'micro-to-macro problem' (Coleman 1994; Smith 1997) and concerns the capacity for theory to explain the relationship between the constitutive elements of social systems (people) and the emergent phenomena that result from their interaction (i.e. organisations, societies, economies). Without the capacity to explain this relationship we would argue there is, in effect, no substantive theory of sociality. The term social is used here to refer to patterns of interaction which take place and persist in time between at least two agents of the same class (species) -in this case -humans.
What is the basis of the micro-macro divide?
The micro-macro problem may be seen to emerge from attempts to resolve two fundamental questions in social science.
• Ontologically, what is the origin or nature of social phenomena and how do they emerge from the actions of individuals in particular contexts of action? • Epistemologically, how is it that we can come to know about social phenomena?
Both of these questions are complicated by the fact that many, if not all, of the contexts of action are themselves social and the act of observation is itself a part of the phenomena being observed and therefore needs to be explained (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Bhaskar 1997) .
Critical Realists argue convincingly that previous attempts to answer these questions have suffered from an inappropriate 'bundling' of epistemic and ontological assumptions (Archer 1998; Bhaskar 1998) . Typically realism is bundled with objectivism and idealism is bundled with relativism. This has led to a dichotomous tendency within social science (Modernism vs Post-modernism, Naturalism vs Antinaturalism) and a resultant plethora of perspectives and their associated assumptions (Burrell and Morgan 1994) . Each offers a valuable perspective but is partial in scope and coverage. Attempts to cover the whole range of phenomena cannot be attained within one position and straddling positions invokes conflicting assumptions.
By teasing these bundles apart an alternative position is possible. Critical Realists argue that an appropriate orientation for social theory is to be found by adopting realist ontology and a relativist epistemology. This is the position we have come to as a result of theoretical analysis undertaken in order to find a consistent basis for our lived experience in organisations.
One of the implications of this approach is the need to distinguish between observable phenomena or pattern and the causal laws which generate them. Furthermore, the distinction of pattern constitutes an act of observation by a particular observer. There is a need, therefore for adequate social theory to clearly distinguish between three layers of reality: "… empirical (observable by humans), actual (existing in time and space), and real (transfactual and more enduring than our perception of it)." (Kaboub n.d) . We argue that such a theory can be arrived at by a synthesis of two existing areas of inquiry- Maturana and Varela's (1980; autopoietic theory and the theory of complex systems. We do not propose this synthesis lightly and nor are we suggesting it as useful metaphor. We are proposing a hypothesis about the constitutive nature of social systems.
Despite some confusion by the originating authors, it can be argued that autopoiesis compels a relativist epistemology ) whilst implying the existence of "… a reality independent of an individual" (Mingers 1995:114) and hence a realist ontology. Complexity theory derives from the natural sciences and assumes a realist ontology. When applied to social systems, however, it has been argued to be compatible with a relativist epistemology (Cilliers 1998; Cilliers 2000) .
The synthesis proposed here provides an internally consistent approach to understanding the relationship between many levels of sociality. In this it has the potential to re-unite current scientific oppositions and avoid unnecessary pluralism within social science.
Why autopoiesis and complexity -are they compatible?
There are a number of reasons why, at least intuitively, a synthesis of autopoietic and complexity theory is alluring. Autopoietic theory provides a basis for understanding the characteristics of the micro-level agents that make up social systems-human individuals. Complexity theory provides a basis for understanding how these characteristics influence the range and type of macro level phenomena that will arise if such individuals are brought together and begin to act in co-ordinated ways.
Both theories are well established, each having its own body of associated literature. Furthermore, the conceptualisation of biological systems proposed within autopoietic theory is philosophically consistent with the underpinnings of the theory of complex systems. These bodies of work overlap to the extent that both conceive of microagents as bounded (autonomous) self-referential systems.
Both of these areas of theory have been previously applied to social science but largely as separate areas of inquiry. For example autopoietic approaches to society have been addressed by authors such as Luhmann (1990) , Mingers (1991) and Zeleny (1991) . Some of these authors argue that social systems are autopoietic rather than simply being comprised of autopoietic entities (humans), but such an extension remains controversial (Bednarz 1988; Mingers 1995) and in our view unnecessary. Furthermore such approaches continue the micro-macro divide by focusing autopoiesis on only the macro structures of social systems.
In the case of complexity theory, important contributions have been made by Eve et al. (1997) in application to sociology, Kennedy and Eberhart (2001) in cognitive science, Cilliers (1998) in cognition and language, Arthur et al. (1997) in economics, Kauffman and Macready (1995) , McKelvey (1997; , Marion (1999) , Boisot (2000) in organisation science, and (Stacey 1996; Stacey, Griffin et al. 2000; Stacey 2001 ) in management. Earlier contributions that are relevant but not explicitly linked to the 'new science' include those of Hejl (1984; In light of these observations it is surprising that no substantive attempts have been made to combine the perspectives of autopoiesis and complexity, the work of Luhmann (1990) and von_Krogh and Roos (1995) being possible exceptions.
In terms of applying these ideas to the study of social phenomena we are aware of a number of problems. Firstly, there has been considerable debate about whether it is feasible or desirable (Mingers 1995) to treat social systems (as opposed to the constituent parts -people) as autopoietic. This debate is beyond the scope of this paper but issues include: a tendency to confuse the productive components of the system and the things produced (Varela et al. 1974; Bednarz 1988; Goldspink 2000b; Kay 2001; Stacey 2001) ; the ability to define the boundary of the system (Mingers 1995 Goldspink 2000b Stacey 2001 ) and a problem of applying theory from one discipline to another (Luhmann 1995) . So autopoietic theory cannot be simply translated across from its biological origins and used as a basis for social explanation. Secondly, while it has become common to do so, the legitimacy of treating social systems in a manner similar to natural complex systems is questionable (Cilliers 1998) . There are distinctive aspects of social interactions, including the reflexive capability of social agents, their ability to observe at multiple levels (as opposed to only locally) and the existence of language as a basis for highly flexible and rapid reciprocal influence which make social systems different from natural systems. For complexity theory to be applied to social systems it needs to be established that there are reasonable grounds for assuming social systems do operate (at least within bounds or under certain conditions) in a manner comparable with natural systems. Alternatively, and this is the path we adopt, it needs to be established that complexity theory can be extended to apply to social systems. We argue a pathway to this extension exists within the theory of autopoiesis.
The phenomenology of social systems

Autopoiesis: Understanding the mechanics of sociality
Autopoietic theory has its origins in biology and readers with a social science background may not be familiar with many of the concepts used. For reasons of space, only a few core concepts will be described here. A clear account of the overall theory may be found in Mingers (1995) and a clear exposition of key concepts in Whitaker (1996) . The elements of autopoiesis which provide a framework for understanding the mechanics of sociality are:
Operational closure: According to the theory, operational closure is a necessary consequence of the biology of living systems. This concept defines the way in which the individual relates to the environment, including the social environment.
Stuctural coupling: Describes the biological implications of recurrent interactions between individuals in the environment and we argue provides the engine for the emergence of social phenomena.
Language: derives from processes of distinction and the nature of cognition -is a particular form of structural coupling of importance in human systems.
Operational Closure
Autopoietic theory (Varela et al. 1974; Varela 1979; Maturana and Varela 1980) , provides a description of the self-producing dynamics that distinguish living systems from non-living. The central thesis is that living systems are characterised by their self-producing (autopoietic) nature. Of more significance to the discussion here, the theory describes the processes and rules underpinning the maintenance of this selfproduction and provides an explanation for the mechanisms of cognition and language Maturana and Varela 1992; Varela et al. 1992 ). However, the theory was not developed to account for social behaviour and its originators have not been enthusiastic to discuss this application of their ideas. Some writers have asserted that social systems themselves are autopoietic (see for example Luhmann 1990; Zeleny 1991) and this has led to considerable debate about the appropriateness of any extension of the theory into the social domain. In the framework we propose here it is important to note that we do not consider social systems to be autopoietic. Rather we argue that the theory provides a foundation for understanding the elemental mechanisms of social systems and how social behaviour can arise from, and is constrained by, the characteristics of human individuals. As such autopoietic theory could be seen to provide an understanding of the biological causal processes from which observable social behaviour derives.
When applied to humans and their behaviour, autopoietic theory raises a number of important challenges. Some of these are at odds with assumptions commonly found in social theory. Firstly, it is asserted that an individual's behaviour is determined by particular states of nervous system activity (Maturana and Varela 1980) . Until one appreciates the rules that define that activity, this does not appear profound. Specifically, Maturana and Varela claim that the nervous system's activity is 'operationally closed'. This means that in all cases nervous system activity results from, and leads to further nervous system activity in a closed cycle (Maturana and Varela 1980) , and therefore is a 'self-referential system' (Hejl 1984) . Possible and actual changes in state of the nervous system are dependent on the nervous system's existing 'structure' or states and not external environmental forces. Environmental forces are usefully considered as perturbations -they act only as triggers for changebut it is the nervous system's structure that dictates which forces can be a trigger (Mingers 1991; . Consequently the process of structural change and any behavioural change emerging from it occurs 'autonomously' for each individual. In other words, changes to the structure of one person's nervous system, and consequently their behaviour, will be unique to that person. The environmental perturbations that act as a change trigger in one person will not necessarily trigger a change in another, or if they do, the change that is triggered may take a different form and/or have different implications for the viability of that person in his/her environment, given his/her history of interactions. It is this 'accommodation' of perturbation that constitutes cognition and this approach is markedly at odds with the common assumption that cognition involves 'representation' of the 'real' world within the brain Cilliers 1998; Kennedy and Eberhart 2001) .
Structural coupling -the basis for sociality
As a result of the process of continual accommodation an individual will experience what Maturana and Varela (1980; describe as a 'structural drift', or a gradual change to the state of their nervous system. The nature of this change will be defined by the individual's history of interactions with the environment. Over time this process traces a unique history − its ontogeny.
From the perspective of any given individual, all other individuals form a part of the environment and add a source of additional perturbation. When two or more people interact, their ontogenies will be mutually influenced as each person's nervous system adjusts its structure in response to the perturbations created by the other. When these interactions become 'recurrent' -that is repetitive and ongoing -individuals can become what Maturana and Varela term 'structurally coupled'. Here we have the most basic element of sociality and one that can be applied to all organisms with nervous systems, even very elementary ones. A history of recurrent interactions leads to a structural congruence or commonality of experience between two or more people -their behaviours become tuned to one another in a reciprocal 'dance' maintained in and through their relating.
The degree of structural coupling that arises when two or more individuals interact is a fundamental factor in determining the dynamics and emergent behaviour of the resulting structurally coupled system. This will be explored further in the next section on complexity.
Language
Significantly, humans have a capacity for a distinctive type of behaviour made possible by the complexity of their nervous system -this behaviour is language (Maturana and Varela 1980; . Remembering that from the perspective of any given individual, the actions of others operate only as environmental triggers for structural change; people trigger change in one another through both behavioural and linguistic means. From this perspective, language is simply a very flexible form of behaviour. From an autopoietic perspective, language does not encapsulate 'meaning' that is then transmitted from one brain to another ). (Mingers 1995:78) These interlocking behaviours both trigger and reinforce commonalities in structure between individuals and over time may become themselves the object of distinction in language. Linguistic behaviour operates recursively as people distinguish aspects of the environment, distinguish their own distinctions and those of others and then further distinguish 'distinctions of distinctions' etc.
Recurrent interaction through both behavioural and linguistic means gives rise to what Maturana and Varela describe as a 'consensual domain'. That is, "…a domain of arbitary and contextual interlocking behaviours"
In the context of studying social systems or institutions, these concepts provide an explanation for the way in which individuals both coordinate their behaviours with one another and develop mutual orientations to their context. A social structure is therefore a domain of structural coupling -a consensual domain. These patterns may take on a certain coherence and robustness. Whilst individual members may change, the broad patterning may remain much the same. The pattern constitutes an apparent closed system of behaviour at the level of the aggregate or system of interacting individuals. This pattern is the observable product of the time and context specific interactions occurring between individuals via the mechanism of structural coupling.
Implications of autopoiesis
What Autopoiesis provides is a model of how phenomena (which we may now call social phenomena) emerge from the complex (and non-linear) interplay between the heterogenous (in having unique ontogenies) agents (people) which make it up.
In the words of Holland "…Emergence is above all a product of coupled, contextdependent interactions. Technically these interactions and the resulting system are nonlinear. " (1998:122) . Consequently, autopoietic theory provides for an understanding of how social structures form and are shaped by the biological characteristics of their constituent (autopoietic) entities. Mapping this onto the three levels suggested by Critical Realism, we can see that the biology of the constituent agents is real or intransitive. It shapes and constrains the nature and types of interaction possible between agents. Phenomena that are generated through structural coupling correspond to the actual -emergent patterns that result from time and context specific interaction between real biological entities. However, these patterns are distinguished by observers (who may also be the actors that give rise to the patterns). The distinctions made by observers correspond to the empirical level. In social systems however, the making of such distinctions immediately feeds back and is one of the factors which influence the time and context specific patterns being distinguished.
So while social structures are emergent and a product of the interaction of individuals, they can and do influence behaviour in much the same way as physical aspects of the environment. They have causal effect and hence ontological status (Bhaskar 1997) . Philosophically then autopoiesis and complexity take us away from a crude empiricism which asserts the primacy of sense experience, and from idealism which denies the existence of a 'reality out there'. Both the biological processes and the patterns of interaction between biological individuals constitute intransitive structures. As such, both have ontological status. They can and often are distinguished by observers -as either physical or causative objects.
The key aspects of our position derived from autopoiesis can now be summarised: humans exist in and through domains which are the product of their structural coupling with an environment. This environment is the world around them including other humans and exists both physically and causally. The domain is a complex product of the context and time specific interactions into which the individual enters. Included in this are the linguistic interactions that arise as individuals generate linguistic distinctions about that environment. As humans enter into reciprocal interaction over time, there emerges, as a consequence of structural coupling, a certain alignment of their behaviours, including their linguistic behaviours. Hence we can refer to the resulting domain as a consensual domain. This domain now forms the basic unit of social analysis, and exists in a causal sense but not a physical one.
In human social systems, individuals come together in many potentially intersecting consensual domains ('work groups', 'families', 'sports clubs'), which are a part of larger more extensive domains ('corporations', 'sub-cultures', 'nations'). An observer may distinguish these as separate and each may usefully and meaningfully be treated as operationally closed in that the recurrent interaction is uniquely determined by the structures of the participating individuals and their individual and collective histories of interaction within a particular environment. Their interaction is self-maintaining and self-referential. This view of social systems as networks and heterarchies of intersecting systems of operationally closed and structurally coupled individuals makes it possible to approach any level or scale of social system in essentially the same way and to analyse them in much the same manner.
As such autopoietic theory provides us with the mechanisms through which individuals relate to their environment and each other, through the notions of operational closure and structural determinacy; it provides an explanation for the generation of language and; provides us with a description of the basic unit of sociality through the process of structural coupling and the generation of consensual domains. Where autopoietic theory is limited is that it fails to provide us with a language or set of concepts with which to describe the behavioural dynamics of individuals in structural coupling, the dynamics of the interactions between multiple sets of structurally coupled individuals or intersecting consensual domains, nor a way to understand the reflexive role of language in the maintenance of these domains. We will argue in the next section that complex systems theory provides these explanatory tools.
Understanding the Dynamics of Sociality: Complexity
As Burrell and Morgan (1994) have identified, a significant proportion of extant social theory is ill suited to understanding the dynamics of social systems, in particular endogenous disorder. How is it that systems which many argue arise through the conscious intent of their actors, nevertheless display considerable disorder? We argue that it is a commitment to trying to understand sociality using linear/reductive concepts/models along with an inappropriate emphasis on intentionality as the primary source of order which is problematic. Within the original work autopoietic systems are argued to be constitutively conservative-making minimal structural change to maintain their autopoiesis. This theory also suggests a dominance of convergent rather than divergent dynamics. Nevertheless the autopoietic view of the mechanics of sociality presented so far provides a non-linear constitutive model as a foundation for exploring social dynamics in contrast to the more common linear models. We are concerned, therefore, to better understand the implications of this non-linear model for our understanding of endogenous social ordering.
Research into complex systems demonstrates that systems containing significant nonlinearity can demonstrate a wide range of behaviours (Prigogine and Stengers 1985; Kauffman 1993; Cohen and Stewart 1994; Bak 1996; Lorenz 2001) . A key contribution of complex systems theory is that it has expanded our capacity to distinguish classes of behaviour characteristic of non-linear systems and provided insights into the micro conditions associated with the emergence of those classes of behaviour. To date however, the theory has concentrated primarily on natural complex systems. A number of schemas have been adopted to categorise the range of behaviours possible. For our purpose a three category schema is sufficient. The categories we will describe are stable, quasi-stable and unstable or chaotic.
Stable systems: Technically a complex system is described as stable in response to a class of triggers if the dynamics show little or no change within a finite time following such a trigger (Stewart 1990) . A system that is stable is often described as following an 'attractor'. This attractor may be a point (ie the system is at rest -in a state of equilibrium) or cyclical (ie the system repeats a fixed pattern of states -displays homeostasis)
Quasi-stable systems: It is possible for a system to display characteristics that we would label as quasi-stable (Stewart 1990; Kauffman 1993 ). In such a system a trigger may initiate a move to an alternate pattern of behaviour. A quasi-stable system may have multiple stable states but be sensitive to certain triggers. When such a trigger event occurs, the system bifurcates or becomes temporarily unstable before moving to a new attractor.
Unstable systems: A system would be deemed unstable where it demonstrates no discernable stable pattern of dynamics. In such systems an observer would determine that there is constant change and no apparent order. A system is described as unstable if a perturbation is amplified and the dynamics of the system change and never settle back to the previous trajectory following a perturbation (Stewart 1990 ). Chaotic systems are unstable. They do exhibit pattern (i.e. their behaviour is non-random) but due to their fractal organisation they never repeat a prior state (Stewart 1990 ). In such systems changes unfold rapidly and the course of events is history sensitive -can be changed by apparently minor events. Kauffman (1991; has shown that the two key parameters that influence the dynamics of a complex system are the number of agents (N) which comprise it and the density of their connection (K). Increasing N and/or K in a system will change its dynamics through a series of critical thresholds from stable to unstable behaviour.
Before we move to explore the implications of these natural scientific observations to social science, it should be remembered that the categories of stable, quasi-stable and unstable are distinctions made by an observer. A lot rests, therefore, on where the observer chooses to draw boundaries and on the level of analysis being undertaken. Applying the categories to social analysis for example, some political systems could be described as unstable (e.g. some South American governments) and others as quasi-stable (e.g. Italy). The changes in Government in Italy have, however, been regular since the end of the Second World War. The quasi-stability discernible at the level of ruling party seems to be part of a higher order pattern or attractor of how Government works in post-war Italy. An alternative conception or analysis at different levels leads to different attributions of order.
Notwithstanding the above caution, provided the observer retains a consistent perspective, it may be possible to study a set of patterns characteristic of a particular social situation and to draw meaningful inferences as to how these patterns arise from the micro-processes operating at lower logical levels. We can then offer plausible arguments as to how the observed order arises as a consequence of the operation of the system as distinguished.
Distinguishing social complex systems
We would argue that in terms of further bridging the micro-macro divide in social theory, complexity theory offers a basis for understanding:
• The range and type of dynamics possible between individuals that are in structural coupling, in particular as a product of their non-linearity.
• The range and type of dynamics possible when consensual domains interact.
• The properties which influence the dynamics of such systems and the mechanisms by which they act.
To link these issues in the broader context of social theory we examine them under the headings of, recontextualising the role of intentionality, divergent social processes and convergent social processes.
To apply complexity insights to social systems there is a need to understand the distinctive qualities of social complex systems and how these impact on the behaviours that they may give rise to. These can be expected to differ from those of natural systems. Secondly, there is a need to recognise that inquiry into the behaviour of social complex systems itself takes place within and is constrained by the very phenomena under study.
Social systems are complex systems of a particular class. In the theory of autopoiesis we have the basis for describing the particular nature of the constituent individuals and how they come to interact and the fundamental dimensions on which they can interact. We notice that these individuals have a capacity for language and that language plays a prominent role in their structural coupling. Language makes it possible for individuals to distinguish 'self' from 'other' and hence these agents are also reflexive. This is quite unlike natural complex systems. Language provides a potent source of behavioural flexibility -one unmatched by natural agents. Furthermore, reflexive agents can observe the behaviour of networks in which they participate and these observations can and often will influence their behaviour. This also is quite unlike many natural complex systems.
In natural systems the behaviours of individuals (atoms, molecules, ants) are triggered by local influences only (Resnick 1997) . In other words, in natural complex systems macro phenomena arise as a result of the complex local interaction of micro-agents. Feedback from macro to micro is either not possible or is indirect -by means of changes induced in the environment which might be felt locally. In systems with cognitive reflexive agents this macro to micro feedback can be more direct as the agent distinguishes macro patterns and changes his/her behaviour as a result. It does not matter if the individual 'correctly perceives' or 'selectively' or 'mis-perceives' the macro behaviour. It will seldom if ever be possible for him/her to anticipate how his/her own behaviour contributes to it due to the presence of non-linearity. The presence of this feedback loop does not therefore necessarily provide a basis for negative feedback nor serve to stabilise the behaviour of the system. On the contrary, it adds significant complexity and additional non-linearity, adding to the analytical irreducibility of the system as a whole. The inherent plasticity of behaviour made possible by language further adds to the non-linear dimensionality of the system and so complex systems comprising human reflexive agents can be expected to generate a very wide range of behaviour indeed. They are both highly dimensional and the dimensionality is itself under the control of the system. Social systems can, therefore, generate what Kaufmann (1991: 66) has called minimal and structural change in that, as a result of the operation of the system itself, both states ('meanings') and structure (relationships) can be modified.
Autopoietic (biological/physical) systems are 'constitutively conservative' i.e. actively compensate for external triggers in order to maintain their viability in their environment (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela 1987) . At the level of the biological individual then we can expect to see a predominance of homeostatic or stable dynamics. This is no surprise -it is necessary for life. Interestingly though, at the level of species more diverse dynamics are observed (as a result of sexual combination and random mutation) and this comprises the basis for selection of more viable biological entities. Higher variability has been demonstrated to be necessary to survive in uncertain environments (Kauffman 1996; Depew and Weber 1997; Depew and Weber 1998) -consistent with Ashby's (1974) theory of 'requisite variety'.
Social systems appear to demonstrate a wide range of behaviours from robustly homeostatic to chaotic. Indeed, from the description proposed here, it would be difficult to identify any natural system that has more intrinsic flexibility and adaptability than a social system. As such we would define social systems as a particular class of complex system, with particular attributes and dynamic properties.
The role of intentionality in social dynamics
The source, form and nature of ordering processes in social systems are also significant in terms of how the micro-macro divide is bridged. Much social and institutional theory assumes a prominent role for intentionality or rationality as a source of social order. For example, within institutional theory order is commonly assumed to be a result of common goals (companies, clubs) or common interests (political systems). Within economics order is posited as a product of rational utility maximisation. Within sociology too, intention is seen as a major contributor to order. Hejl (1984: 69) recalls Max Weber's definition of social action as an action "which through the intention of the actor or actors is related to the behaviour of others and whose course is oriented at their behaviour." For Weber then, social behaviour was intentional and cooperative.
In systems theory two types of goal directed behaviour are recognised (Checkland 1988) . These are teleology, or explicit goal directedness which is consistent with that assumed by management theory for example; and teleonomy, or apparent goal directedness. Within social theory there is often a failure to distinguish between these two concepts when discussing intentionality. Within the context of the unfolding discussion it should be clear that any explicit goal directedness present is at the level of the autopoietic individual not at the level of the social system. Social systems comprise individuals with multiple (often conflicting) explicit intentionalities derivative of their individual ontogonies. Any purpose attributed at the level of the social systems must be teleonomic -it is a distinction made by an observer based on his/her having recognised a pattern at the level of the system. That pattern will reflect the 'apparent purpose' which results from the interplay of behaviours (intentional and otherwise) at the level of the individuals.
Within complexity theory, processes that give rise to order in the absence of an external directive agent are referred to as self-organising processes (Kauffman 1993; Bak 1996) . Autopoiesis is one example of an autonomous system that exhibits selforganisation. In this case it is a relatively stable phenomenon emerging out of the metabolism of the cell (at the level of cell biology) and the structural determinacy of the nervous system at the level of an individual animal or human. Self-organisation is a process of getting 'order for free' (Kauffman 1993) and is a product of non-linear interaction.
In social systems a recurrent pattern may also result from self-organisation. In this case it will be a result of a complex interplay between the intentional behaviour of the individuals that comprise it and unintended and contingent factors (McKelvey 1997) . The intentional or goal based behaviour of individuals is just one influence on the whole system behaviour and cannot and should not be expected to be dominant. For example, a business cycle (which results from non-linearity in the processes of economic exchange) would represent a cyclical attractor at the level of an 'industry'. It arises as company management pursue their various goals within a broader industry environment that contains some non-linearity. The business cycle is not what was 'intended' by anyone and it may or may not be possible to locate the source of nonlinearity which produces the cyclical economic behaviour. It is a complex product of the interactions of all firms and consumers within the economic and social environments within which they operate. From this perspective macro level social order is a complex product of micro-level intentionality and the wider non-linear operation of the system.
Divergent or disordering processes
Social systems have been shown to generate considerable levels of disorder. The origin, source and nature of this disorder requires further explanation. If social systems were primarily brought about and maintained by intentionality then we would not expect the level of disorder commonly observed. As discussed above, Kauffman has shown (1993) that the two main parameters that influence the dynamics of complex non-linear systems are the number of agents (N) and the density of their connectivity (K). A question then arrises; what might be the nature of NK dimensionality in social complex systems? By dimensionality we mean the number and nature of linkages between heterogeneous agents in a system. Transferring Kauffman's concepts to social complex systems, the dimension N is relatively clear. This will refer to either a) the number of human individuals participating in a consensual domain and/or b) the number of intersecting consensual domains depending on the level of analysis. From the framework developed here it has been established that individuals couple behaviourally (including linguistically). The density of coupling (K) will therefore refer to the number of ways in which an individual couples behaviourally with others and/or the number of nodes of intersection between domains, depending on the level of analysis adopted by the observer.
Focusing on the individual level, what might dimensionality of behavioural coupling mean and how might it be measured? There is clearly a need for further research to clarify how such a concept can be applied to social systems. Indeed, this might be considered as a threshold issue for the application of complexity to social systems. What can be argued is that linguistic coupling broadens the requisite variety of potential interactions. People couple in language on many dimensions; every linguistic exchange will invoke and establish a dynamic pattern of interactions which is unique, while being constrained by the consensual aspect of language in the context and history of that social structure. In human social systems then, recurrent interaction is being continually maintained in a flux of intertwining webs of linguistic, behavioural and emotional interaction. This is highly dynamic never being the same from one instance to another. The combined effect of heterogeneity (difference in experience and behaviour) of individuals and this highly plastic basis of interaction adds significant non-linearity and dimensionality. As a result such systems can be expected to generate highly varied dynamics.
Turning now to the level of intersecting domains; any given individual will commonly participate in the generation and maintenance of many consensual domains ('work team', 'sports club', 'family') concurrently. (Hejl 1993: 76) .
It is inevitable that every individual will be participating in many different domains simultaneously. Intersecting domains have the potential to exhibit very irregular and 'far from equilibrium' behaviour as they continually perturb one another. Again then, the potential for divergent, indeed chaotic, dynamics is very substantial.
In conclusion, contrary to the assumptions underpinning most social theory (Burrell and Morgan 1994) , endogenous disordering processes exist within social systems and can be seen to arise as a consequence of the nature and structure of such systems. From the perspective of the framework presented in this paper, order arising from the intentionality of individuals coexists with this 'complexity order' (McKelvey 1997) . When social systems are approached in this way the challenge becomes explaining order not dis-order. This is taken up below.
Convergent or ordering processes
Sociologists regularly observe 'norms', 'rituals' and 'conventions' within social behaviour. These are indicative of stable patterns of interaction and behaviour. Following the framework being set out here these can be seen as patterns of reduce dimensionality of coupling between participating individuals. As a consequence the system is more stable and thus less adaptive or responsive to perturbation. Note that these patterns need not be the product of rational choice but the product of the operation of the system -they are illustrative of a self-organisational potential. It should be clear that such patterns inevitably arise through structural coupling in a behavioural and/or linguistic domain. The 'norms' are the consensual elements of that domain. The effectiveness of such structures in regulating social interaction does not require rational choice or voluntary participation. Some individuals may choose to adopt the 'norm' or may adopt a pattern of 'blind following'. Both will suffice to stabilise the network.
There is still a need to examine if there are regulatory mechanisms that operate to stabilise the dynamics that result from the intersection of social domains. In order to explain how and why social systems can co-exist and not mutually annihilate and to explain the possibility of diverse societies reaching a stable state we might expect to find some self-organisational potential for containing it at this level. Kauffman and Macready (1995) have pointed to one such mechanism. Regulation at inter-group level may be achieved by controlling the degree of cross membership.
Kauffman and Macready have shown the importance of the concept of 'patch size' for the stability of systems involving groups and it is conceivable that as the number of groups individuals participate in rises, the size of intersecting social groupings overall must fall to maintain some order. Reduction of 'patch' size and/or reduction in the dimensional coupling between 'patches' can serve to stabilise otherwise unstable systems involving intersecting social domains.
In conclusion, unlike much extant social theory, complexity theory can help us understand the nature and origins of divergent dynamics as well as convergent dynamics when applied to a social theory derived from autopoiesis. Up to now the application of complexity to social phenomena has commonly been metaphorical. Here it has been demonstrated that there is a substantive base for its application to social systems albeit with some extension and development. Now the legitimacy of its use in social systems research is established it offers a consistent framework for understanding dynamics at seemingly opposite ends of the scale -high stability and chaos -and points to the factors which shape and influence alternative dynamics in social systems.
Limitations and future research
Although a number of issues have been addressed in this paper there remain a number of key areas where further definition is required and research is needed.
The area in greatest need of explication is the definition of dimensionality in the context of social interaction. We have proposed a connection between Kauffman's NK model and the notion of structural coupling as described in autopoietic theory. This idea has great promise but clearly needs considerable development.
There is a need also to respond to McKelvey's insight that much of what is interesting in social dynamics may be the result of the interplay between alternative sources of order, in particular the order that results from complex organisation, and intentional order. The nature of this interplay is still poorly understood.
The theoretical framework set out here lends itself to implementation, testing and development using the rapidly advancing approach of computer simulation (Gilbert and Conte 1995; Conte, Hegselmann et al. 1997; Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999) , in particular multi-agent simulation (Brassel, et al. 1997; Goldspink 2000a; Goldspink 2002 ). This method would provide an effective means for experimenting both with what NK dimensionality means and the implications of intentionality of social agents in social complex systems.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an argument for a new approach to the consideration of social systems, an approach based upon a synthesis of autopoietic and complexity theory. The basis of our argument stems from a desire for a consistent framework (both ontologically and epistemologically) for understanding the mechanisms or generative processes underpinning the emergence of social systems on the one hand, and the dynamical or behavioural dimensions of social systems on the other. We have argued that whilst many of the approaches currently available for the consideration of these phenomena provide explanatory value at one phenomenological level of inquiry or another, none provide a consistent framework that links both the constitutive (micro) and emergent (macro) dimensions of social organisation.
Autopoiesis provides a model of how phenomena (which we may now call social phenomena) emerge from the complex (and non-linear) interplay between the heterogenous (in having unique ontogenies) agents (people) which make it up. Complexity then allows us to explain the resulting dynamics by describing the generative processes that link empirical observation and causal actuality. Social systems can be seen as a specific class of complex systems and it is autopoiesis which clarifies the distinguishing characteristics of this class, in particular the linguistic/reflexive character of social agents.
In the synthesis of autopoiesis and complexity we have a basis for understanding the mechanics and dynamics of sociality. The two are linked in that it is possible to demonstrate the basis for common epistemological and ontological roots and implications. Together they suggest an adoption of ontological realism and epistemological relativism and hence a position consistent with the philosophy of Critical Realism.
The theory provides considerable reach across phenomenological levels and hence a bridge between the micro and macro. It does this by:
• Describing the mechanisms by which social systems emerge in a way consistent with human biology.
• Describing the nature of language in a manner consistent with human biology and how language influences the emergence of social structures.
• Explaining how the difference between individuals is both a product of their biology and their history of involvement in social processes and how the distinct ontogeny of each individual gives rise to heterogeneity, and therefore non-linearity at the level of the social. This heterogeneity then explains the mechanism by which convergent and divergent changes arise in social systems.
• Explaining the mechanisms which influence the dynamic potentiality of social systems in particular those which serve to regulate on the one hand and generate divergent change on the other.
The tendency of past theoretical approaches to resolve the micro-macro tension by discounting the ontological status of one side or the other is resolved by explicating the mechanisms by which the two interact. Social phenomena is thus regarded (due to its demonstrable derivation from micro-processes and effect on those micro processes) to have ontological status.
Unlike the existing state of affairs where almost every phenomena in social systems is approached using a different theoretical lens, many of which are incompatible, here we have a foundation for an integrated approach. While some will no doubt argue that the current state of affairs provides a rich and pluralistic environment and an adequate basis for day to day decision making, others like us, will find this unsatisfactory. Clearly a framework which can provide for an integrated perspective of and explanatory theory covering phenomena from the biological nature and constraints which govern human cognition and behaviour, through to the dynamics of aggregate and emergent structures, is attractive.
